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Some regard the Jali Commission as another expensive exercise aimed at making recommendations that have
little effect. To many South Africans, the Grootvlei video on prison corruption televised nationally this year,
was the beginning of a revelation.  But would this video have seen the light of day if the Jali Commission did
not exist? And would there have been a specialised unit to investigate corruption, had the commission not
been there? It is likely that the Jali Commission has indeed changed the way in which commissions of this kind
are perceived.  
The militaristic and secretive nature of theprison environment prior to 1994 meant thatlittle was known of the institution except that
it kept criminals away from law-abiding citizens. A
commonly held view was that people who landed
in prison deserved to be kept in custody; some even
advocated that criminals should be permanently
locked away. Even the South African government
showed little interest in correctional services.
However, what happens in prisons and to prisoners
is in fact everyone’s affair. When prisoners have
served their sentences they return to society, and
are more often than not left to their own devices. It
is likely that they will struggle to re-integrate into
society. 
With the new Correctional Services Act,
management has sought to move away from the old
militaristic and secretive way of running prisons.
Human rights forms part of the new discourse,
alongside the concepts of reintegration and
rehabilitation. There is now a realisation that at
some stage society will come face to face with
former prisoners, and that both parties need to be
prepared for this encounter. 
However, changing the way prisons are run is
proving to be a challenge for the new
management.  Among the many challenges facing
the Department of Correctional Services (DCS), is
to rid the department of rampant corruption.
Although the former commissioner of correctional
services, Khulekani Sithole, is to blame for much of
the prevailing corruption, his actions highlighted a
deep-seated problem.  Since his tenure came to an
end, more rot has been exposed. What is also
evident is that much of the effort to combat and
prevent corruption was either ineffective or non-
existent. It took almost two years for the
department to initiate any action against Sithole,
and when that finally happened, Sithole resigned.1
It was after Sithole left that DCS embarked on
concerted efforts to establish effective anti-
corruption measures.
The prelude: three years of investigations
In 1998, when Ben Skosana took over as minister
of the department of correctional services, several
employees approached him raising allegations of
rampant corruption and financial mismanagement.
The minister then initiated investigations into these
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allegations through the Auditor-General (A-G), an
independent Chapter Nine institution which reports
directly to parliament. 
The A-G’s report revealed that corruption was a
serious problem in prisons. The report was then
presented to the parliamentary standing committee
on public accounts (SCOPA).2 Following the A-G’s
presentation, the department was summoned to
appear before SCOPA. During the same period the
public service commission reported to parliament
that government had effectively lost control of the
department. 
These events necessitated further investigation into
prison corruption. In 1999 the minister of
correctional services approached the department of
public service and administration (DPSA) to
conduct a further inquiry.  A management audit of
DCS was then ordered. Ben Skosana and the
minister of the DPSA presented the final report of
the audit to the president on 18 February 2000.
The audit revealed more allegations of corruption
and mismanagement, prompting further
investigation. The DPSA and the public service
commission (PSC) jointly conducted the second
phase of the investigation. The PSC focused on
malpractice in the human resource department,
while the DPSA focused on allegations of
impropriety. On 16 March 2001 the DPSA and PSC
presented their reports to a joint sitting of the
parliamentary portfolio committees for public
service and administration, and correctional
services.
As a result of these investigations 51 people have
been dismissed, 118 reprimanded and 
33 criminally convicted to date.3 However, the
informal nature of the investigations meant that
many questions remain unanswered. This
necessitated the establishment of a formal judicial
commission of inquiry. In July 2001, some three
years and many investigations later, the minister of
correctional services approached President Thabo
Mbeki and requested him to appoint a commission
of inquiry to investigate allegations of corruption,
crime, mismanagement, violence and intimidation
in DCS. 
The Jali Commission’s task
The Jali commission of inquiry was appointed on 
8 August 2001, headed by Judge Thabani Jali. The
commission was set to run for 12 months at a cost of
R12 million.4 However, as the commission began its
hearings it became apparent that it would require more
money as well as an extension of the deadline. The
terms of reference of the commission required it to
prioritise the following prisons: Pietermaritzburg
management area, Durban Westville management area,
Ncome management area, Johannesburg management
area, Pollsmoor management area, Pretoria
management area, St Albans management area and
Leeuwkop management area.
This did not preclude investigations into other prisons
should the need arise. For example, the hearing at
Grootvlei prison in the Free State did not form part of
the nine prioritised management areas and was not
budgeted for. However, the nature of complaints from
Grootvlei necessitated a special sitting by the
commission, a time-consuming exercise and one that
stretched the limited resources.
The appeal to the president by the minister of DCS to
appoint a commission stems largely from complaints
that emanated from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). It was
alleged that a number of warders were accepting bribes
from prisoners and in exchange organised escapes.  At
the time KwaZulu-Natal had the greatest number of
pending disciplinary cases in the country. Furthermore,
there were allegations that DCS vehicles were used to
carry out attacks in the Midlands, and witnesses to
these crimes were either intimidated or killed. The Jali
Commission’s main task is to investigate allegations of
corruption, mismanagement, violence and intimidation.
The terms of reference of the commission include:
i) inquiring into reports of alleged incidents of 
corruption;
ii) making recommendations regarding steps that 
can be taken in order to prevent the future
occurrence of such incidents;
iii) making recommendations regarding steps that 
can be taken against an employee who in terms 
of the findings of the commission is implicated in
impropriety against an employer;
iv) inquiring into and reporting on any other matter 
which in the commission’s opinion is relevant to 
its terms of reference.
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 2 NOVEMBER 2002 29SEKHONYANE
Achievements thus far
The Jali Commission’s hearings in KwaZulu-Natal,
Free State and the Eastern Cape revealed further rot
in South African prisons. In KwaZulu-Natal six
officials were suspended; two serving sentences for
the murder of a whistle-blower. The commission
has furthermore recommended that 80% of the
prison employees in Westville prison be axed.5
Since they started operations in September 2001 the
Jali Commission has revealed some shocking
incidents of corruption, including:
• sales of drugs, firearms and alcohol;
• the unfair dismissal of a prison psychologist;
• prison warders sodomising juveniles;
• sale of juveniles to older hardened criminals for 
sex;
• murder of a whistle-blower;
• a prisoner and families in KwaZulu-Natal using 
DCS vehicles;
• nepotism, unfair recruitment and promotions.
It is evident from these hearings in selected prisons
that corruption in South African prisons is rampant.
South Africa has about 240 prisons, and the
revelation of corruption in three of the four prisons
investigated so far appears to be the tip of the
iceberg. 
Thabani Jali – the man for the job
Thabani Jali is a judge at the competitions appeal
court in Durban.  Prior to being appointed as a
judge he worked as an attorney for 15 years, and
was also a member of the legal resources fellowship
in Durban.  He is no stranger to commissions.
Between 1996 and 1997 he was a member of a
two-member commission of inquiry into problems
at the Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg, Pollsmoor
and Victor Verster prisons.  Victor Verster is the only
prison of the four that is not under inquiry by the
Jail Commission. No more were Jali’s strength and
independence tested than during the Grootvlei
saga. DCS tried to prevent the broadcast of the
video, and afterwards the department wanted to
subject the head of Grootvlei to disciplinary action.6
However, the presence of the commission
prevented the department from taking actions that
would have further embarrassed them. Jali also
revealed more corruption within Grootvlei,
unperturbed by attempts to silence the commission.
The Grootvlei saga
Grootvlei prison in the Free State shot into the
spotlight after four inmates sneaked a video
camera into prison to capture corruption.  The
video, aired by the SABC’s Special Assignment
programme, showed shocking scenes of warders
drinking with prisoners, juveniles being sold for
sex to older prisoners, warders smuggling a gun,
drugs and alcohol into prison, and food being
sold to warders from the prison kitchen. The
footage shocked the public and angered DCS.
However, the video highlighted serious problems
of corruption in prisons and highlighted the need
for effective anti-corruption measures.
Investigation units with clout
Subsequent to the initial hearings of the Jali
Commission in KwaZulu-Natal, the Free State and the
Eastern Cape, the minister of justice and constitutional
development declared that corruption and
mismanagement are to be probed by a special
investigating unit (SIU). The SIU will have powers to
prosecute those targeted by the Jali Commission –
powers that the commission does not have. The SIU
will in effect complement the work of the commission.
It is estimated that the SIU probe will cost R20m, the
bulk of which will be provided by DCS. However,
where necessary, the justice department will
contribute, and, in the event of a shortfall, the treasury
will be approached.7
The SIU’s main task will be to provide forensic
investigations in support of the Jali Commission.
Experienced investigators will be seconded from the
unit and may later be incorporated into a permanent
DCS anti-corruption unit.8 In addition to the SIU, DCS
has considered requesting the Directorate of Special
Operations (DSO) or the Scorpions to investigate
prison corruption.
This represents a significant shift in the DCS, given
that it is financing a probe into its own affairs – a
remarkable example of transparency and commitment
to combating corruption. One of the key problems in
the battle against corruption relates to the perceived
ineffectiveness of the correctional services system.
Corrupt individuals have always been fairly confident
that they would not be caught, and even if they were
caught they could assume that there would be no
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sanction. This created an environment of impunity.
The presence of the specialised unit will at least
ensure the prosecution and conviction of corrupt
employers and employees.
Management and internal disciplinary systems
The challenge for DCS is to seize the opportunity
that currently presents itself. While these
investigations are being conducted, it is important
that the department examines its management and
disciplinary systems and their efficiency.  
What is evident from the Grootvlei and
Pietermaritzburg hearings is that the supervision of
wardens and prisoners is weak. However, the
management of the entire prison system has been
rather weak. In the case of Pietermaritzburg, a
certain individual was appointed to a senior position
although he did not possess the relevant
qualifications.  Subsequent to this appointment he
employed family and friends who were equally
unqualified. It would certainly appear that at least a
few of the Natal Midlands prisons were in the hands
of incompetent managers.
In the Grootvlei case, management and internal
disciplinary systems are also relevant to the matter. It
has to be asked why the head of prisons would have
allowed the recording of the video. There are a
number of possible answers, but it is possible that
he did not have faith in the disciplinary systems
available for dealing with corruption within DCS. 
The Pietermaritzburg and Grootvlei examples are an
indication that the problem does not simply lie with
corrupt individuals but that it goes back to the
system itself. Some of the recommendations from
the DPSA management audit refer to the following
deficiencies in the system:  
• insufficient training of DCS personnel; 
• a lack of appropriate qualifications;
• a lack of appropriate appraisal systems; and
• the design, structure and physical environment 
of DCS facilities. 
Building employees’ morale
Often overlooked, but very crucial, is the matter of
building morale among DCS staff. Overcrowding,
gang violence, corruption, long hours and an
increase in natural deaths take a heavy toll on
prison employees.  It has been said of DCS that staff
morale is crumbling alongside the walls within
which they are working. 
It is disheartening when combating corruption
becomes the priority of an institution. When this is
the case, the institution is effectively unable to
deliver much else.  
An effective system requires sound management
practices that embrace good values and principles.
Employees know what their job descriptions are and
are committed to delivering good service. It is not a
system that constantly reacts to crises. The starting
point is the appointment of suitable people to
positions where they can perform optimally.
Recruitment policies need to be refined, transparent,
and adhered to. The lesson is ‘do not let the rot enter
your environment and thrive in it’. 
Signs of real change 
With the appointment of the Jali Commission an
immediate concern was raised: what would it
ultimately deliver? Would it simply produce another
report, or would it lead to effective action? The
announcement of the appointment of the special
investigation unit to investigate corruption in prisons
came as good news.  It signalled that the commission
will not be toothless, unlike some of its predecessors.
Moreover, its findings prompted DCS and the
Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development to act decisively.  
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